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Preface
It is with great that we present the second volume of the series “Population and
Family Studies”. In this book, we study demographic developments in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (MENA). In the past, the demographic developments in
the Middle East and North Africa have been described as “peculiar” and “unique”.
In particular, the development of fertility got attention from a western point of
view because it did not show the sharp decline with increasing development as
the western countries did. Moreover, the growing population size and the bulk
of young people caused worries, particularly in Europe, where a discussion about
“the death of the West” has started. Thus, the demographic processes in the Mid-
dle East and North Africa call for a closer inspection of the recent levels and tends.
Surprisingly, there is notmuch literature on these countries, leading us to compile
essential descriptive ﬁndings.
In the present book, we evaluate the current state and recent demographic de-
velopments in the MENA countries by presenting comparable and recent data on
changes since 1950 and on the current characteristics of the population in the
22 countries of the Arab League (Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt,
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, State of Pales-
tine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, Yemen) plus three neighboring countries (Israel, Turkey, and Iran)
using databases of various United Nations agencies and the World Bank. We de-
liberately refrain from discussing population forecasts which, due to assumptions
underlying to them, would be worth to be discussed separately.
In the ﬁrst chapter, we provide a comprehensive demographic picture of the
region by discussing various indicators jointly which yield additional insights in
the demographic processes of the individual countries. In particular, we take the
level and trends of fertility, mortality and natural increase into account. We ana-
lyze howmigration processes contribute to annual population growth and investi-
gate age structures as well as demographic dividends and demographic potentials.
Our main ﬁndings are: (a) a natural increase in population in all countries; (b) an
increase in fertility in three countries; (c) changing age structures that do not sup-
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port the notions of a ‘youth bulk’ or population aging; (d) substantial migration
but diverging patterns of refugee migration; (e) no guarantee of a demographic
dividend; and (f) a heterogeneous picture in terms of the country-speciﬁc phases
of demographic transition. Our ﬁndings underline that the MENA countries have
to respond to demographic developments to beneﬁt from both the demographic
dividend and the population momentum by adapting their economic, social and
political institutions.
In the second chapter, we take a closer look on the association of fertility and
human development by analyzing various dimensions of development including
wealth, health, education and gender equity. We present both cross-level asso-
ciations for diﬀerent points in time and time-series associations for the individ-
ual countries. We also apply ﬁxed-eﬀects models to investigate to what extent
fertility can be explained net of unobserved country and time eﬀects by various
components of development. The results show that education, especially aver-
age years of female schooling and share of females with no education, and other
non-economic components of development (i.e., health and gender equity) have a
greater impact on fertility than economic progress. The negative association be-
tween the Human Development Index and fertility becomes J-shaped at higher
levels of Human Development and reverses to positive. In the same way, the neg-
ative relationship between gender equity and fertility turns positive above a certain
threshold. Similar toWestern countries, someMENA countries with higher levels
of development experienced a reversal on the fertility-development link, suggest-
ing that other countries in the region will experience an increase in fertility, if the
social and economic development continues. On the other hand, fertility declines
in countries where the share of females with no education are relatively high may
continue until reaching a certain level of development.
With this volume, we also aim at stimulating further research on the MENA
countries. While we concentrated here on aggregated macro data from various
international agencies, there is also – at least for some MENA countries – ex-
cellent micro data available both for cross-sectional and for longitudinal analysis.
These data are not suﬃciently known by the scientiﬁc community and thus under-
analyzed. We hope for more research in the near future on the world’s probably
fastest growing region.
Bamberg, January 2018
Henriette Engelhardt
Chapter 1
Demographic Developments
1.1 Introduction
The demographic developments in theMiddle East andNorth Africa (MENA) have
previously been described as “peculiar” (Obermeyer 1992: 33) and “unique” (Om-
ran 1980: 97). This is due to its diﬀering nature with the concept of demographic
transition which suggests a transition from high birth and death rates to lower
birth and death rates leading to an accelerating population growth (Thompson
1929). This transition is expected to occur in every society experiencing modern-
ization including educational, economic and social progress (Kirk 1996: 365).
There have basically been two succeeding streams of literature on the demo-
graphics in MENA countries. First, in the 1980s, demographers described the
Arab Middle East as a region with poor demographic performance (Cleland and
Wilson 1987; Fargues 1989). Unlike the negative relationship between fertility
and development in Western countries, which has also been discussed within the
framework of the “death of the West” (Coleman and Basten 2015), the association
was weak and sometimes positive in the Arab region (Omran 1980: 97). Moreover,
the overall declines in mortality lagged behind expectations based on levels of eco-
nomic development (Caldwell 1986; Courbage 1999). Obermeyer (1992) counter-
argued that mortality ﬁt well with models of demographic transition, although
regional trends in fertility rates lagged behind economic development. Thus, de-
mographers have disagreed on the timing of mortality decline, with some even
suggesting that fertility declines have lagged behind improvements in the econ-
omy. In the last two decades, others claimed that birth and death rates declined,
while educational facilities increased (Rashad 2000; Eltigani 2009; Casterline 2009;
Courbage 2015; Loichinger et al. 2016); whereas, more recently, Courbage (2015)
and Samari (2017) have documented increased fertility in Egypt and Algeria. Us-
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ing comparative, as well as country-speciﬁc analysis, Groth and Souza-Poza (2012:
9) even summarized “that few stylized observations apply uniformly to Muslim
countries, whose heterogeneity is enormous” and that the demographic develop-
ments resemble a jigsaw puzzle.
A second stream of literature has stressed the eﬀect of declining fertility and
mortality levels on the age-structure resulting in a youth bulk (Roudi-Fahimi and
Kent 2007; Courbage 2015; Courbage and Puschmann 2015), population ageing
(Rashad and Khadr 2002; Yount and Sibai 2009; Hussein and Ismail 2016), eco-
nomic growth (Jones 2012; Loichinger et al. 2016), and migration (Fargues 2006,
2008). According to economic literature, the demographic transition can boost
economic growth by increasing the size of the labor force (Bloom and Williamson
1998; Birdsall et al. 2001; Bloom et al. 2003). The positive eﬀect the country-
speciﬁc age structure has on economic performance should occur during the in-
termediate phase of the demographic transition. This “demographic dividend”
or “bonus” has been assessed using age dependency ratios, as well as growth
rates of working-age population (Jones 2012; Loichinger et al. 2016). Decreasing
demographic support ratios and growth of the working-age population between
1990 and 2010 point to a demographic dividend in the MENA region (Jones 2012,
Loichinger et al. 2016). Furthermore, age-structure not only aﬀects economic
growth, but also the future demographic potential of a country (Billeter 1954). Al-
though this relation seems obvious, there is – according to our knowledge – no
empirical evidence on this issue for the MENA countries.
Several years have passed since these two debates about the demographic tran-
sition (for an overview see Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005, 2012), and the de-
mographic proﬁles of many Arab countries have changed. Previous ﬁndings, of
which some are surprising from a western perspective, call for a closer inspec-
tion of the actual levels and trends of demographic processes, as well as of the
demographic dividend and potential in the region. To evaluate the current state
and recent demographic development in the MENA countries, we present com-
parable and recent data on changes since 1950, and on the current characteristics
of the population in 25 countries using the databases of various United Nations
agencies (Population Division, Statistics Division). We consciously resign from
discussing forecasts due to the strong underlying assumptions (United Nations
2015b; Loichinger et al. 2016), but provide a comprehensive demographic picture
of the region.
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We discuss various indicators jointly which yield additional insights in the de-
mographic processes and present self-calculated indicators to assess the demo-
graphic potential. In doing so, we add to the literature in ﬁve ways: ﬁrst, we de-
scribe the socioeconomic and geographical context with indicators of gross domes-
tic product, urbanization, and population density. Second, we consider the level
and trends of crude fertility and mortality, and natural increase. Third, against
this background, we analyze how migration processes have contributed to annual
population growth since 1950. Fourth, we inspect fertility and mortality processes
usingmore speciﬁc demographic indicators. Fifth, we discuss the level and trends
of the resulting age structures, demographic dividends, and demographic poten-
tials. We close with a discussion of the observed processes and identify issues that
call for closer inspection in the near future.
1.2 The region
There have been several approaches to choose the countries for MENA region
analyses (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005, 2012; Casterline 2009; Crane et al. 2011;
Courbage 2015; Loichinger et al. 2016). We use a broad deﬁnition of the MENA
region and consider the 22 members of the “Arab League”, plus three neigh-
boring countries (Israel, Turkey, and Iran). We analyze each of these 25 coun-
tries separately. Additionally, we perform regional comparisons considering (1)
the Arab least developed countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Su-
dan, Yemen); (2) the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates); (3) the Mashreq countries
(Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria); and (4) the Maghreb countries
(Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) (Loichinger et al. 2016: 1). As the neighboring
countries Israel, Turkey, and Iran did not clearly ﬁt into any of these groups, we
dropped these three countries from the regional comparison. The regional demo-
graphic proﬁles are displayed in the Appendix.
Except for Israel, Islam is the dominant religion throughout the region. The
25 countries strongly diﬀer regarding their economic and social conditions and
are, moreover, culturally diverse, particularly because of numerous religious and
ethnic minorities (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005: 505). The demographic weight
of these countries varies substantially (Figure 1.1, cf. Tabutin and Schoumaker
2005: 511). The region includes three countries with large populations, each with
more than 70 million inhabitants (Egypt, Iran, Turkey). The region also includes
20
Figure 1.1: Demographic weight of the MENA countries in 1950 and 2015.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
two countries with less than onemillion inhabitants (Comoros, Djibouti), and two
countries with less than two million inhabitants (Bahrain, Qatar). In sum, the
MENA region was home to 1,279 million people, with a population of 224 million
in North Africa. For comparison, in 2015 the United States had 322 million and
Western Europe 445million inhabitants (Figure A1). However, the Arab world has
grown rapidly over the past decades. In 1950, only 66 million people were living
in the region, whereas by 2015, the population was nearly twenty times that size.
On the level of single countries, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates experienced
huge increases of their population over the last 60 years. In Tunisia, Turkey, and
Morocco, the population increased by factors between 3 and 4 over this period.
This makes the region the second-fastest growing in the world over that period,
lagging only behind Sub-Saharan Africa.
The 25 countries of the MENA region have also extremely contrasting geo-
graphical features in terms of surface areas and population densities (Tabutin and
Schoumaker 2005: 510). Their land areas range from 6,220 square kilometers
in Palestine to almost 2.4 million square kilometers in Algeria. In many coun-
21
Figure 1.2: GDP per capita at current prices in US Dollars and share of urban
population, 1950–2014.
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tries, vast regions are covered by deserts and steppes, and population is mainly
distributed in the coastal zones (Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf), or along
rivers (e.g., Nile, Tigrus, Euphrates). Thus, crude densities of population (inhab-
itants per square kilometers) as reported by the United Nations Population Divi-
sion (2015a) – ranging from 3.6, 14.5 and 14.7 inhabitants per square kilometer
in Libya, Oman, and Algeria, respectively, to 373 in Israel 572 in Lebanon, 765 in
Palestine and 1,812 in Bahrain – may not elicit the real crowding of the popula-
tion. Moreover, they are poor indicators of the relationship between agricultural
resources and population (Mathieu and Tabutin 1996). Very diﬀerent pictures
emerge when looking at the population densities based on arable and permanent
crop land areas (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005: 511).
Alternatively, the share of urban population as reported by the United Nations
Population Division can be considered. Note that these numbers are based on
country-speciﬁc deﬁnitions of cities. Bahrain, for instance, deﬁnes agglomera-
tions with more than 2,500 inhabitations as cities, whereas Lebanon takes 5,000
22
Figure 1.3: Crude death and birth rates and rates of natural increase (per 1,000
population), 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
inhabitants as a threshold for urban population (UN 2014: Sources for Urban
Population). As shown in Figure 1.2, the share of urban population increased re-
markably in all MENA countries. In 2014, the majority of the population in many
of these countries lived in cities. In Lebanon, Jordan, Bahrain, and in the United
Arab Emirates, up to 80% of inhabitants lived in cities. In Qatar, Kuwait, and Is-
rael, only 10% of the population was residing in rural areas. In Western Europe
and in the United States, about 80% of the population were living in urban areas
in 2014 (Figure A2).
1.3 Demographic transition
Figure 1.3 shows the mortality and fertility patterns for the 25 countries from
1950-55 to 2010-15 based on crude death rates and crude birth rates per 1,000
inhabitants. As the model of demographic transition suggests, the entire region
experienced a decline in mortality in the 1950s and 1960s. The initially very high
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mortality, ranking between 30,592 in Libya and 6,261 in Israel, fell to values rang-
ing from 12,386 in Somalia to 1,489 in Qatar. In 2015, the crude death rates of
Western Europe and the United States were 9,699 and 8,238, respectively.
Birth rates, also initially very high, ranging between 53,321 in Iraq and 32,976
in Israel, decreased much more slowly until the 1980s. The birth rate then started
to fall more quickly, while mortality levelled oﬀ. In the period 2010-15, crude
birth rates varied between 43,912 in Somalia and 11,199 in the United Arab Emi-
rates. Most interestingly, crude birth rates suggest an increase in fertility in Alge-
ria, Egypt, and the Lebanon since 2010, when the “Arab Spring” occurred in these
countries. In 2015, the crude birth rates of Western Europe and the United States
were 10,218 and 12,601, respectively (Figure A3).
Although reported regularly in studies on the demographic transition, the cru-
de birth rate, as well as the crude death rate, gives only a vague hint on the pace
of fertility and mortality in a country. This is because it depends strongly on the
country-speciﬁc age structure, as well as on the country- and age-speciﬁc mortality
rates. Therefore, we inspect the fertility and mortality per country in more detail
based on more speciﬁc demographic indicators.
The diﬀerent patterns of onset and speed of decline in mortality and fertil-
ity yield diﬀerences in the shape of the demographic transition. Tabutin and
Schoumaker (2005: 521f., 2012: 2) have grouped countries according to their lat-
est birth and growth rates and labeled these patterns as ‘traditional’, ‘classical’,
or ‘advanced’. However, the heterogeneous patterns found in Figure 1.3 do not
support such classiﬁcations in a longitudinal perspective and only a few countries
indeed show similar patterns (e.g., Mauretania and Sudan, or Libya and Oman).
1.4 Population growth and international migration
The annual rate of population growth between two points in time – conventionally
expressed in percentage units per year (United Nations 1983) – is calculated as an
exponential rate of growth. Obviously, in almost all countries the annual growth
rate does not follow the shape of the natural population growth. As Figure 1.4
shows, the shape of annual population growth is closely linked to the rate of net
migration (deﬁned as diﬀerence between in and out migration per 1,000 popula-
tion). The estimates of net international migration are calculated as the diﬀerence
between overall population growth and natural increase (United Nations 2015b);
24
Figure 1.4: Annual growth rate and net migration rate (per 1,000 population),
1950-55 to 2010-15.
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it is not possible to calculate net migration from counts of in- and out-migration
with the existing country-speciﬁc data.
Compared to Western Europe and the US, the annual growth rate in all four
MENA regions is considerably higher (Figure A4). In the region of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council, the annual growth rate declined sharply from 1970-75 to 1990-95,
increased till 2005-10 and decreased sharply thereafter. This increase and decline
is closely linked to the ﬂow of migrants, in particular labor migrants, generated by
a strong demand for labor due to the oil boom in the 1970s. The increase of the
annual growth rate in the least developed Arab countries is driven by the inﬂux of
refugees at the beginning of the 1970s.
In the literature, theMaghreb- andMashreq-countries apart from Jordan are re-
garded as sending areas, theGulf States are looked upon as net-receivers (Puschmann
and Matthijs 2015: 130). Thus, in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates, immigration would reinforce annual population
growth, while in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Pales-
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Figure 1.5: International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population
and refugees as percentage of international migrant stock, 1990 to
2015.
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Data: United Nations (2015c).
tine, and Iraq, emigration would temper annual population growth. However,
this assessment in the literature is not supported by Figure 1.4.
Economic and political situations strongly shape country-speciﬁc netmigration
rates. For example, the Lebanese Civil War (1975-90) produced a high increase in
the annual ﬂow of Lebanese emigrants; the Iranian Revolution in 1979 resulted
in a large wave of emigration; and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing
ﬁrst Gulf War (1980-88) were responsible for the expulsion of temporary migrants
working in Iraq and the Gulf States. In the end, netmigration in theMENA region
is similar to net migration in the US and Western Europe, while annual growth is
considerably higher.
Figure 1.5 shows data on international migrant stock as a percentage of the to-
tal population (measuring the number of foreign-born population in a country at
a particular point in time) and refugees as a percentage of international migrant
stock. In 2015, 34.5 million international migrants, including refugees, were re-
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siding in the MENA region (International Organization for Migration 2016). The
destinations with most international migrants in the MENA region are Saudi Ara-
bia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon in descending order.
Nearly three quarters (74%) of international migrants reside in the countries of
the Gulf Cooperation Council. This includes over 10 million in Saudi Arabia and
8 million in the United Arab Emirates, which together host over 50% of all inter-
national migrants in the MENA region.
Compared to Western Europe and the US, the stock of international migrants
in the Gulf Cooperation countries is considerably higher (Figure A5). The highest
share of migrants is in the United Arab Emirates with 88.4% of all inhabitants be-
ingmigrants in 2015 (Figure 1.5). Despite the sizeable share ofmigrants, the share
of refugees as a percentage of international migrant stock in the individual coun-
tries of the Gulf Cooperation countries amounts to zero (Figure 1.5). The MENA
countries with lower stocks of international migrants obviously have a higher per-
centage of refugees. In particular Lebanon, with a share of international migrants
among a total population of 34.1 percent, has a particularly high percentage of
refugees (80.1 percent).
1.5 Fertility
In the Arab League, the average number of children per woman has declined
markedly since 1950. For example, total fertility in Northern Africa declined by
3.47 children per women (from 6.74 in 1950-55 to 3.27 in 2010-15). However, fer-
tility across the region is considerably heterogeneous. The United Arab Emirates
experienced the sharpest decline: fertility fell by 5.15 children, from 6.97 in 1960-
55 to 1.82 children per woman in 2010-15 (Figure 1.6). Kuwait’s fertility decline
was similar, falling from 7.20 children in 1950-55 to 2.15 children in 2010-15. As
in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, fertility declined by more than 50% in
Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey during this period.
In some of these countries, however, the pace of fertility decline has stag-
nated. In three countries, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, fertility remains at three or
four children per women. In four countries, fertility is already close to replace-
ment (Bahrain, Kuwait, Tunisia, Turkey) and in two countries below replacement
level (Lebanon, United Arab Emirates). Not all the countries have experienced
sharp declines in fertility. In seven countries, fertility remains above 4 children
27
Figure 1.6: Total fertility and mean age at birth, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
per women. Somalia, with a total fertility of 6.61 children, has the highest total
fertility in the region. On average, the total fertility rates of the MENA region are
still higher than in Western Europe (1.66) and in the US (1.89).
The sharp decline in fertility in many of the MENA countries has been at-
tributed to several factors, including the rising age at marriage for women and
men, delayed childbearing (see Figure 1.6), increased availability and use of mod-
ern contraceptive methods, higher levels of female education, increased female
labor force participation, improved status of women, and urbanization (Mirkin
2010: 13f.).
However, the trend of the age-speciﬁc fertility rates shows that the decline in
total fertility is caused mainly by a change in the quantum of fertility at all ages,
rather than a change in the tempo of fertility (Figure 1.7). Delayed child-bearing is
only the case for selected countries during the years 2010-15 (e.g., Algeria, Saudi
Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates). Thus, a change of fertil-
ity in MENA countries is very diﬀerent from the patterns of change in Western
Europe and in the US (Figure A7), which show quantum and tempo eﬀects of fer-
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Figure 1.7: Age-speciﬁc fertility rates (births per 1,000 women), 1950-55 to
2010-15.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
tility similar to Libya: a decline in the level of fertility at all ages and postponed
childbearing to higher ages.
1.6 Mortality
Throughout our observation period, considerable advances in life expectancy at
birth have emerged in the MENA countries (Figure 1.8). In 1950-55, 8 of 25 coun-
tries had life expectancies below 40 years at birth. In 12 of the 25 countries, life
expectancies at birth ranged from 40 to 49 years, and in only 3 countries life ex-
pectancies at birth reached 50-59 years. By 2010-15, life expectancies had dramat-
ically shifted upwards across all MENA countries, so that only 4 countries had life
expectancies of less than 60 years. The majority of these countries had life ex-
pectancies between 70 and 79 years. In Western Europe and the United States,
life expectancy at birth was at about 81 and 79 years, respectively, in 2015.
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Figure 1.8: Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate (both sexes
combined per 1,000 live births), 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
The advances in life expectancy at birth during the last decades is mainly due
to the improvement of life expectancy at higher ages, whereas at the beginning
of the 1950s, infant mortality still was part of life. As Figure 1.8 shows, infant
mortality (i.e., infant deaths per 1,000 live births) decreased considerably during
the last decades. In 2010-15, Comoros, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen had
infant mortality rates between 79 and 50, while all other MENA countries ranged
well below 50 cases. InWestern Europe and the United States, the infantmortality
rate was at 3 and 6, respectively, in 2015 (Figure A8).
Concerning the male and female diﬀerences in life expectancy, the MENA
countries show the well-known gender gap with male excess mortality (Figure
1.9). However, while in many Western countries the gender gap has narrowed
over time (Luy and Gast 2014), this seems only the case for Bahrain, the United
Arab Emirates, and to a smaller extent to Qatar and Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain, the
diﬀerence in life expectancy at birth in 2010-15 was 1.84 years, while it was 7.38
years in 1950-55. In the United Arab Emirates, the diﬀerence decreased from 5.99
30
Figure 1.9: Male and female life expectancy at birth, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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to 2.21 years during the same period. In a minority of MENA countries, the gen-
der gap in life expectancy remained constant over time, whereas the diﬀerence
in longevity increased in many others, suggesting that women gained more from
medical progress compared to men. In Western Europe and in the United States,
the diﬀerence in life expectancy at birth was about ﬁve years to the advantage of
women in 2015 (Figure A9). Most interestingly, the diﬀerence in life expectancy
in all MENA regions except the Mashreq suggests less gender speciﬁc mortality
compared to Western Europe and the United States.
1.7 Age structure and demographic dividend/potential
Over the course of the demographic transition, declines in fertility and mortality
cause important changes in a population’s age composition. In general, countries
in the early stages of the transition have a younger age structure than countries in
the later stages.
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Figure 1.10: Median age, share of population age 15 to 24 and 65+, 1950 to 2015.
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As can be seen in Figure 1.10, most MENA countries have J-shaped median
age throughout the period of investigation. The countries, though, diﬀer with
respect to the reversal of the trend. Although it was earlier in Bahrain, Lebanon,
Morocco, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, it was quite late in Algeria, Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In the year 2015, the median age
ranged between 16.5 in Somalia and 30.7 in Qatar. This is quite young compared
to the median age of 43.7 years in Western Europe, or 38.0 years in the United
States in 2015 (Figure A10).
Despite the increase in median age, population ageing measured by share of
population aged 65+ can only be observed for Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon,
Tunisia, and Turkey (Figure 1.10). However, the increase in median age is closely
linked to a declining share of the population under age 15 inmostMENA countries
(Figure 1.11). Exceptions to this pattern are Comoros, Djibouti, Israel, Maureta-
nia, Somalia, and Sudan, where there is no visible clear downward trend in the
share of younger population.
32
Figure 1.11: Share of population under age 15 and 15 to 64, 1950 to 2015.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
The share of the working age population is usually used as ameasure of the de-
mographic dividend. Figure 1.11 shows that in all MENA countries the share mir-
rors inverted the share of children under age 15. In most countries, we clearly ob-
serve an increasing share of the working-age population and a decreasing share of
the young population. This trend is particularly pronounced in Kuwait, Lebanon,
Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. In countries such as Algeria, Bah-
rain, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, the increase has leveled oﬀ in recent years. Somalia
is the only country in which the working-age population is decreasing slightly, and
in Israel, the population aged 15-64 has been rather stable over the last decades.
The share of the 15 to 24 years old in relation to the total population (or to
the population aged 25 to 64 years) is usually used as the measure of the youth-
bulge. Figure 1.10 clearly shows that the youth bulge already belongs to the past
in most MENA countries. For instance, Lebanon reached its maximum in 1976,
Saudi Arabia in 1999, Libya and Morocco in 2000, Algeria in 2004, Egypt and Iran
in 2005. Only Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, and Mauritania have shown a sustained
youth-bulk for many decades.
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A changing age distribution has signiﬁcant social and economic consequences,
such as the allocation of education, healthcare, and social security resources to
the young and old (Bongaarts 2009). Assessments of this impact often rely on
the so-called total age-dependency ratio which summarizes key changes in the
age structure. In this study, the total age-dependency ratio at a given point in
time equals the ratio of population aged below 20 and over 64 to the population
of age 20-64. This ratio aims to measure how many “dependents” there are for
each person in the “productive” age group. Obviously, not every person below
20 and over 64 is a dependent, and not every person between ages 20 and 65 is
productive. Despite its crudeness, this indicator is widely used to document broad
trends in the age composition. Additionally, the young-age dependency ratio (the
ratio of population aged below 20 to the population of age 20-64), or the old-age
dependency ratio (the ratio of population aged over 65 to the population of age
20-64) can be considered.
Over the course of a demographic transition, the total age-dependency ratio
is supposed to show a characteristic pattern of change. Figure 1.12 presents this
pattern as observed in the MENA countries from 1950 to 2015. Early in the transi-
tion, the age-dependency ratio typically rises slightly, as improvements in survival
chances of children raise the number of young people. Following this, the age-
dependency ratio falls sharply, as declines in fertility reduce the proportion of the
population under age 15. This decline has important economic consequences be-
cause it creates a so-called demographic dividend, which boosts economic growth
by increasing the size of the labor force relative to dependents and by stimulating
savings (Birdsall et al. 2001). In Western countries that are at the end of the tran-
sition, the age-dependency ratio ﬁnally increases again, as the proportion of the
population over age 65 rises. This is not yet the case in the MENA countries.
Figure 1.12 additionally plots the young age dependency ratio from 1950 to
2015. Most interestingly, it follows almost the same pattern with the total age-
dependency ratio. Even though forecasts by the United Nations Population Divi-
sion (2015b) expect population aging for the MENA countries, albeit to a lower
degree than in the western world, ageing does not seem a major problem for the
MENA countries until now.
Finally, Figure 1.12 plots Billeter’s J (Billeter 1954) for the 25 MENA countries.
This indicator divides the diﬀerence of the population aged under 15 and over 50
(under and over reproductive age) by the population aged between 15 and under
50 (reproductive age). Billeter’s J follows the country-speciﬁc patterns of the child
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Figure 1.12: Child dependency and total dependency ratio and Billeter’s J, 1950
to 2015.
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Data: United Nations (2015a).
dependency and total dependency ratio. Most interestingly, in all countries except
Somalia, there is negative demographic potential in the year 2015. In Bahrain,
Kuwait, Qatar, and theUnited Arab Emirates, this trend of a negative demographic
potential already started in the 1970s. For many countries, though, the number
of persons under a reproductive age more or less equals the number of persons
above a reproductive age until 1990 (Egypt, Iran, Joran, Libya, Morocco, Oman,
Syria, Tunisia). The negative values of Billeter’s J in all MENA countries in 2015
clearly oppose the continuously increasing shares of persons of a reproductive age
and suggesting an end of population growth inMENA countries due to a declining
demographic potential.
1.8 Discussion
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the demographic develop-
ments in the Middle East and North Africa. Against the background of earlier dis-
35
cussions about poor demographic performance of this region or the demographic
transition model, we provided recent data on demographical change in MENA
countries. By rearranging standard indicators and adding self-calculatedmeasures
of demographic development, we highlight ﬁve important aspects which call for
closer inspection in the recent future.
First, as suggested by themodel of demographic transition, we ﬁnd a decline in
fertility and mortality in the MENA countries. The observed patterns (i.e., time of
onset and speed of decline) are very heterogeneous across the countries and do not
strictly follow the transitionmodel. In all countries under investigationwe can still
observe a natural increase in population. This increase in population, however, is
declining in all countries; exceptions are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Israel. Moreover,
the annual growth of the population is strongly linked to the net migration in all
MENA countries. This result stresses the important role of migration for further
population growth – a point which can be addressed in population projections only
with strong assumptions.
Second, the age-speciﬁc fertility patterns suggest that the decline in fertility
in most countries is due to a decline in the quantum of fertility rather than in the
timing of fertility. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe an increase in fertility in
Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon in recent years. Whether this increase is due to early
births (tempo eﬀect), or will result in an increase in completed fertility (quantum
eﬀect), is a topic for future research. Another surprising ﬁnding is the increasing
diﬀerence between male and female life expectancy which also calls for further
investigation.
Third, the demographic transition from high fertility and low life expectancy to
low fertility and high life expectancy results in changing age structures. Previous
literature has strongly emphasized the importance of youth bulk and population
ageing (Roudi-Fahimi and Kent 2007; Courbage 2015). According to the concept
coined by political scientists (Fuller 1995; Goldstone 1991), “an excess of young
adult males in a population leads to social unrest, war and terrorism, as ‘third and
fourth sons’ (within the same family) ﬁnd nor prestigious positions in their exist-
ing societies. Therefore, these ‘lost sons’ rationalize their impetus to compete with
religion a political ideology” (Courbage and Puschmann 2015: 213). Contrary to
this literature, we do not ﬁnd a youth bulk in the MENA countries with the latest
available data. Furthermore, our ﬁnding is supported by the decrease in child de-
pendency in all countries apart from Somalia. While the median age is increasing
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in all countries, except Somalia, population ageing in terms of an increased share
of population aged 65+ is not an issue yet for most MENA countries, except Israel.
Fourth, the changing age-structure suggests, but does not guarantee, a demo-
graphic dividend. Nevertheless, a demographic dividend does not conform eco-
nomic development on its own. To reap the beneﬁts and to capitalize on the grow-
ing pool of potential workers, MENA countries will have to adapt their economic,
social, and political institutions. “Educational systems, labor markets, housing
supply, and health systems will need to expand and adapt to meet the needs of
young people and the countries’ economies. A demographic bonus can only oc-
cur when a large young population is healthy, educated, trained, and ready to be
absorbed into a market economy” (Roudi-Fahimi and Kent 2007: 16). Thus, to
reap the demographic dividend, suﬃcient jobs, a skilled labor force, housing and
health care is required. Without such investments, the demographic bonus will
not be realized, or could even become a burden when an increasing working-age
population cannot gain access to productive employment (Khadr 2012: 139). In
other words: “Without the right policy environment, countries will be too slow
to adapt to their changing age structure and, at best, will miss an opportunity to
secure high growth. At worst, where an increase in the working-age population is
not matched by increased job opportunities, they will face costly penalties, such as
rising unemployment and perhaps also higher crime rates and political instabil-
ity” (Bloom et al. 2007: 4). Moreover, increased emigration processes and “brain
drain” will be likely (Winkler 2009).
Fifth, as has been shown, the MENA countries are in diﬀerent phases in the
process of demographic transition. At the end of the demographic transition –
when fertility levels-oﬀ at replacement level, and mortality stops declining – nat-
ural population growth reaches zero. Therefore, the age structure needs to be
adjusted to the post-transitional levels of fertility and mortality (Bongaarts 2009).
This adjustment is a slow process and takes many decades to complete. Thus, in
cases of relatively young populations, population growth continues for many years
after replacement fertility is reached. This tendency is referred to as population
momentum (Bongaarts and Bulatao 1999). The population momentum inherent
in the age structure at a certain point in time can be estimated using a population
projection. Therefore, future fertility must be set to the replacement level, while
mortality is held constant andmigration is assumed to be zero. To our knowledge,
estimations of the population momentum for MENA countries are not available,
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but would add to our understanding of future demographic developments in the
region.
Sixth, we observed substantial migration in the MENA countries. In all coun-
tries the annual growth rate is closely connected to net migration. This result
might be partially caused by the estimation of net migration as the diﬀerence be-
tween population growth and natural increase in most countries (United Nations
2015b). Country speciﬁc data on international migrant stocks at any particular
point in time show that the MENA countries with the highest share of migrants
are those with zero refugees. It should be noted that the interpretation of the
international migration data becomes more complicated when looking at country-
speciﬁc deﬁnitions: “When does a visitor become a shortterm migrant, and when
does a short term migrant become a long-term migrant? When does a tempo-
rary migrant become a permanent immigrant? When does a migrant become a
national?” (Johansson de Silva and Silva-Jáuregui 2004: 5). Questions such as
these, as well as the inconvenient situation of available migrant-ﬂow data, make it
diﬃcult to assess the issue of migrations (with-)in the MENA regions. However,
there is plausible evidence of migration triggers in the MENA countries (e.g., Far-
gues 2008), such as the ‘demographic gift’ of sharply declining birth rates, which
creates intertemporal beneﬁts for those who do not have to support future genera-
tions, lacking labor-market opportunities, or environmental conditions. Together,
this evidence outlines the actual situations, though they are hardly testable with
existing data (a shortcoming that researchers normally admit).
Finally, we need to comment on the data of our analysis. We have used themost
recent data from diﬀerent United Nations agencies for each of the presented in-
dicators. This data is sourced from censuses, sample surveys, national estimates
based on population register data, or estimates based on census or survey data
(United Nations 2015a). The survey data include survey programs, such as the
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), Multiple Cluster Surveys (MICS), Re-
productive Health Surveys (RHS), Pan-Arab Project for Child Development Sur-
veys (PAPCHILD), Pan-Arab Project for Family Health Survey (FAPFAM), as well
as other national surveys. It should be clearly noted that an indicator for one coun-
try could be based on census data, while for another country the same indicator is
calculated from survey data. For instance, total fertility is based on annual birth
registers for Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, while it is based on DHS data from diﬀer-
ent years for Comoros. For other countries, such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Oman, total
fertility is based on a mixture of diﬀerent sources. These diﬀerent sources of data
38
apply to each one of our indicators. Thus, the country comparisons are all based
on the assumption of internal and external validity of all indicators, as are all other
studies using this kind of international comparative macro data. Evaluating this
assumption is far beyond the scope of our paper; nevertheless it should be kept in
mind when concluding on our results.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
Figure A1: Demographic weight of the MENA regions, Western Europe and the
USA in 2015.
100,000 200,000 300,000
 
Population (thousands)
Gulf Cooperation Council
Arab least devel. cntry
Maghreb
Mashreq
Western Europe
USA
2015
1950
2015
1950
2015
1950
2015
1950
2015
1950
2015
1950
Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
40
Figure A2: GDP per capita at current prices in US Dollars and share of urban
population of the MENA regions, Western Europe and the USA,
1950-2014.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2014, 2016).
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Figure A3: Crude death and birth rates and rates of natural increase (per 1,000
population) of the MENA regions, Western Europe and the USA,
1950-55 to 2010-15.
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15 50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15 50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15
Arab least devel. cntry Mashreq Maghreb
Gulf Cooperation Council Western Europe USA
Crude death rate Crude birth rate Natural increase
 
R
at
e 
of
 n
at
ur
al
 in
cr
ea
se
C
ru
de
 ra
te
 
Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A4: Annual growth rate and net migration rate (per 1,000 population) of
the MENA regions, Western Europe and the USA, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A5: International migrant stock as percentage of total population and
refugees as percentage of international migrant stock of the MENA
regions, Western Europe and the USA, 1990 to 2015.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A6: Total fertility and mean age at birth of the MENA regions, Western
Europe and the USA, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A7: Age-speciﬁc fertility rates (births per 1,000 women) of the MENA
regions, Western Europe and the USA, by selected years, 1950-55 to
2010-15.
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Data: Own calculations based on age-speciﬁc female population weighted country-speciﬁc data
(United Nations 2015a).
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Figure A8: Life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate (both sexes
combined per 1,000 live births) of the MENA regions, Western
Europe and the USA, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A9: Male and female life expectancy at birth of the MENA regions,
Western Europe and the USA, 1950-55 to 2010-15.
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
40
50
60
70
80
40
50
60
70
80
50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15 50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15 50-55 70-75 90-95 10-15
Arab least devel. cntry Mashreq Maghreb
Gulf Cooperation Council Western Europe USA
Males Females Difference
 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y
Li
fe
 e
xp
ec
ta
nc
y 
at
 b
irt
h
 
Data: Own calculations based on male and female population weighted country-speciﬁc data
(United Nations 2015a).
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Figure A10: Median age, share of population age 15 to 24 and 65+ of the MENA
regions, Western Europe and the USA, 1950 to 2015.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A11: Share of population under age 15 and 15 to 64 of the MENA regions,
Western Europe and the USA, 1950 to 2015.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
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Figure A12: Child dependency and total dependency ratio and Billeter’s J of the
MENA regions, Western Europe and the USA, 1950 to 2015.
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Data: Own calculations based on total population weighted country-speciﬁc data (United Nations
2015a).
Chapter 2
Fertility and Human Development
2.1 Introduction
Until recently, the negative association between fertility and development was
both common empirical and theoretical knowledge (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996;
Bryant 2007; Lee 2003). The substantial declines in fertility during the last century
coincidedwith substantial increases in economic and social development. Starting
alreadywithMalthus (2013[1789]), it has been assumed that fertility decreases with
increasing levels of development. Along the same lines, demographic transition
theory argued that in countries undergoing modernization, long-term economic
growth should lead to a transition from high to low birth and death rates (Davis
1945; Notestein 1945). Later, the theory of demographic transition was expanded
to predict ever-decreasing fertility rates with economic growth in various kinds of
contexts (Caldwell 1976, 1982; Kirk 1996; Lee 2003).
In recent years, questions have been raised about the relationship between fer-
tility and development. In their study published in “Nature”, Myrskylä et al. (2009)
reported stimulating results on the fertility-development link, despite employing
the same socioeconomic progress and development measure (i.e., Human Devel-
opment Index) as used in past research (e.g., Bongaarts andWatkins, 1996). Based
on data for over 100 countries they found that the negative relationship between
the Human Development Index (HDI) and the total fertility rate (TFR) (i.e., in-
creases in HDI are associated with decreases in TFR) can be reversed at advanced
HDI levels with HDI being positively related to TFR. This observation has been
referred to as “the income/development-fertility reversal”, “inverse J-shaped asso-
ciation”, or “convex relationship between income/development and fertility” (Fox
et al. 2015).
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Using time series from 1960 onwards, Luci-Greulich and Théveonen (2014)
also found a change in the relation between fertility and GDP per capita above a
certain threshold of economic development for 30 OECD countries. Moreover,
by decomposing GDP per capita into several components, they identiﬁed female
employment as a co-varying factor for the fertility rebound. Pointing to diﬀer-
ences in the compatibility of childbearing and female employment, their results
suggest that fertility increases are likely to be small if economic development is
not accompanied by institutional changes that improve parent’s opportunities to
combine work and family life. This conclusion is consistent with Myrskylä et al.
(2011), who argued that the reversal of fertility trends is conditional on gender
equality: countries ranking high in development, as measured by health, income,
and education, but low in gender equality, continue to see declining fertility.
Theoretically, the impact of human development on fertility remains ambigu-
ous (Lacalle-Calderon et al. 2017). Indicators of this new positive association in-
clude rising female employment (Luci-Greulich and Thévenon 2014), changing at-
titudes towards female employment and childbearing behaviors (Lestheaghe 2010;
Goldstein et al. 2009), delay of childbearing to older ages (Myrskylä et al. 2011),
the end of postponement of births (Goldstein et al. 2009), changing norms of con-
traceptive use and childbearing behavior (Myrskylä et al. 2011; Esping-Andersen
and Billari 2015; Anderson and Kohler 2015), and increasing gender equality both
at an institutional, as well as on a household level, which reduce work-family con-
ﬂicts (Anderson and Kohler 2015; Myrskylä et al. 2011).
Empirically, authors such as Furuoka (2009, 2013) and Harttgen and Vollmer
(2014) have questioned the change in the fertility-development association. Fu-
ruoka (2009, 2013) found a negative association between fertility and development
in countries with lower levels of development, whereas the relationship remained
negative, albeit weak, in countries with a high HDI. In the same vein, using the
recent revision of the HDI calculation, Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) have found
no evidence of the inverse J-shaped association, and the relation betweenHDI and
fertility could not withstand the recent HDI calculation revision. Moreover, they
reported that the use of a composite measure masks the individual contribution
of the economic and social components.
Regardless of the long history of research, there is no consensus on the rela-
tive importance of diﬀerent human development components for fertility change
(Bryant 2007; Lee 2003; McDonald 2000b; Ryabov 2015). Traditionally, the main
focus has been placed on economic fertility determinants in Western societies
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(Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Becker et al. 1994; Mason 1997; Bryant 2007).
However, recent publications also focus on the social, non-economic components
of human development, including education, health, and gender equity as predic-
tors of trends in fertility, at least in developed countries (e.g., Goldstein et al. 2009;
McDonald 2000b; Myrskylä et al. 2013).
Until recently, research on the fertility-development link described above has
focused on highly developed Western societies and produced mixed results. Less
is known about the association and its development over time for other regions,
and ﬁndings are limited to pooled analyses suggesting fertility declines at low and
medium development levels (Furuoka 2009; Myrskylä et al. 2009). A noteworthy
gap of knowledge concerns countries of theMiddle East andNorth Africa (MENA),
which have been among the fastest growing regions in the last decades that do not
clearly follow the demographic patterns as suggested by the transition theory (cf.
Chapter 1).
In this study, we aim to shed light on the longitudinal relationship between fer-
tility and development in the MENA countries. Speciﬁcally, we examine to what
extent fertility trends in the MENA countries can be explained by development.
Taking into consideration the various development dimensions, we analyze both
the association of human development and its components (wealth, health, and
education). In doing so, we further assess the importance of these various devel-
opment indicators in explaining fertility and question how the prevailing patterns
of HDI and its components may inﬂuence fertility trends in the MENA region.
Our empirical analysis is based on graphical depictions of the time series asso-
ciation of fertility and development, as well as on a panel analysis to account for
country- and time-speciﬁc heterogeneity.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents our empirical ﬁnd-
ings on the association of human development and fertility. Sections 2.3 to 2.6
focus on wealth, health, and human capital, as well as gender inequality on the
four dimensions of human development. Section 2.7 estimates the eﬀects of the
various dimensions of human development under control of country and time-
speciﬁc heterogeneity. Section 2.8 concludes by summarizing the main ﬁndings
and identifying directions for further research.
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2.2 Progress in human development
Our empirical analysis of the fertility-development association is based on a time
series for the 22 countries of the Arab League – Algeria (DZ), Bahrain (BH), Co-
moros (KM), Djibouti (DJ), Egypt (EG), Iraq (IQ), Jordan (JO), Kuwait (KW), Le-
banon (LB), Libya (LY), Mauritania (MR), Morocco (MA), Oman (OM), State of
Palestine (PS), Qatar (QA), Saudi Arabia (SA), Somalia (SO), Sudan (SD), Syrian
Arab Republic (SY), Tunisia (TN), United Arab Emirates (AE), and Yemen (YE),
plus three neighboring countries – Israel (IS), Turkey (TR), and Iran (IR).1 The
diﬀerent time series vary in length, depending on data availability.
Fertility is measured by the country-speciﬁc annual total fertility rate (World
Bank 2017). The total fertility rate reﬂects the number of children that would be
born to a woman during the considered age window if she experienced the age-
speciﬁc fertility rates observed in a particular year. The main weakness of the
TFR is that it is subject to tempo eﬀects of fertility (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998;
Sobotka and Lutz 2011). Tempo adjusted fertility measures may provide a more
comprehensive overview of the fertility trends and may (partly) explain changing
TFR (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012).
While acknowledging this critique, the TFR is the only available fertility mea-
sure for most of the MENA countries which allows a longitudinal analysis of the
association of fertility and development. Moreover, it is plausible that the TFR
provides extensive insight on fertility for MENA countries for two reasons. Firstly,
“TFR is the most widely used indicator of fertility, as TFR is a key determinant of
the number of children born in a calendar year, and thus of population ageing
and population growth/decline”, and most public debates on fertility trends focus
on the TFR (Myrskylä et al. 2011: 38). Secondly, as reported by Engelhardt and
Schulz in Chapter 1 of this volume, changes of fertility in MENA countries are
very diﬀerent from the changes of fertility in advanced societies (see Balbo et al.
2013 for a review of fertility in advanced societies). Age-speciﬁc fertility rates have
not experienced a shift towards the right for most MENA countries, suggesting
that the mean age at ﬁrst birth has not changed considerably in this region.
1 As Israel has diﬀerent demographic patterns to the rest of the MENA region and stands as an
outlier inmost of the analyses, cross-countries analyses were also conducted by excluding Israel
(not shown). Signiﬁcant diﬀerences of these additional analyses are reported in the related
sections.
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As in previous studies (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Myrskylä et al. 2009,
2011), we measure the level of socioeconomic development using the human de-
velopment index (UNDP 2015). The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) occasionally updates the exact deﬁnition of the HDI, which makes time-
series analysis challenging. As explained by Myrskylä et al. (2011: 7), the sub-
indexes’ arithmetic mean was used to calculate HDI until 2010. With the 2011
revision, items in the sub-indexes were re-deﬁned and the calculation method was
changed into the geometric mean.
The 2011 HDI revision provided consistent measurements that are compara-
ble over time, and this time consistent index included: (i) annual life expectancy at
birth, referring to the health component of development. (ii) logarithm of the an-
nual gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in
US dollars referring to the standard of living. (iii) Average of the adult literacy rate
and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross school enrolment ratio,
referring to the human capital endowment. This index – termed the hybrid-HDI
by UNDP – yields slightly diﬀerent results compared to longitudinally inconsis-
tent HDI. For consistency and comparability, we follow Myrskylä et al. (2011) by
using this index.2
To illustrate the association of human development and fertility, Figure 2.1
shows the relationship between HDI and the total fertility rate for the years 1990,
2000, 2010, and 2015 (cf. Pesando et al. 2017). It is apparent from this ﬁgure
that all MENA countries have experienced socioeconomic progress and develop-
ment since 1990. Consistent with previous studies, the graph suggests that coun-
tries undergo a unidirectional trend towards lower fertility with only limited cross-
regional diﬀerences as they progress towards higher development. The negative
association can be observed for diﬀerent points in time (year 1990: 𝑟2= -0.601,
year 2000: 𝑟2 = -0.663, year 2010: 𝑟2 = -0.702, year 2015 𝑟2 = -0.662). However,
we have observed a slight increase in fertility once a certain threshold of human
development has been passed.
2 Data on human developmentwas limited to life expectancy for Comoros, Lebanon, and Somalia.
Thus, these countries are only included in the fertility-life expectancy analyses.
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Figure 2.1: Relationship between total fertility rate and human development,
1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015.
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Note: The solid line represents the overall trend computed using a Lowess smoother.
Data: Total fertility rate: World Bank (2017); Human development index: UNDP (2017a).
These ﬁndings are also in line with the study of Myrskylä et al. (2009) which
found a reversed positive relationship between HDI and TFR above a certain HDI
level. Nonetheless, this increase in fertility above a certain HDI level is mainly
driven by Israel. After excluding Israel in further analysis, only a stall in fertility
above a certain threshold level was observable.
Can the cross-sectional pattern also be conﬁrmedwhenwe look at country-level
trajectories? Figure 2.2 complements the cross-sectional analysis with a longitudi-
nal perspective by showing country-speciﬁc fertility-development trajectories. Fig-
ure 2.2 conﬁrms in a longitudinal perspective – at least for some countries – what
the cross-sectional analyses suggested: For Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia, fertility
increased after a certain level of development. But, when the country-level trajec-
tories are examined speciﬁcally, the turning point of fertility seems to be at a lower
level of development than suggested by Myrskylä et al. (2009). For MENA coun-
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Figure 2.2: Time series association of total fertility and human development,
1990-2015.
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Data: Total fertility rate: World Bank (2017); Human development index: UNDP (2017a).
tries, fertility reversal seems to occur at a level of human development of about 0.6
to 0.7.
2.3 Economic progress
Next, we investigate the economic component of human development, which is
traditionally in the focus of fertility research (Luci-Greulich and Thévenon 2014).
Figure 2.3 depicts the relation between GDP per capita and the total fertility rate
for the years 1975, 1990, 2000, and 2015. In 1975, the association between GDP
and fertility was rather weak (𝑟2 = -0.118). The association increased successively
over time (year 1990: 𝑟2 = -0.261, year 2000: 𝑟2 = -0.369, year 2015: 𝑟2 = -0.497).
But, the association was clearly non-linear, and the decline of fertility levelled oﬀ
after the GDP’s initial increase.
The time series association of total fertility and GDP per capita depicted in
Figure 2.4 yields deeper insight into the increasingly negative relation from a lon-
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between total fertility and GDP per capita, 1975, 1990,
2000, and 2015.
DZ
EG
IN
IR
IS
JO
KW
MR
MA
OM
QA
SO
SD
SY
TN
TR
AE
DZ
BH
KM
DJ
EGIN
IR
IS
JO
KWLB
LY
MR
MA
OM
QA
MOSD
SY
TN
TR
AE
YE
DZ BH
KM
DJ
EG
IN
IS
JO
KW
LB
LY
MR
MA
OM
PS
QA
DO
SD
SY
TN
TR AE
YE
DZ
BH
KM
DJ
EG
IN
IR
IS
JO
KWLB
MR
MA OM
PS
QA
FR
SO
SD
TN TR
AE
YE
2
4
6
8
2
4
6
8
0 20000 40000 60000 0 20000 40000 60000
1975 1990
2000 2015
To
ta
l f
er
til
ity
 ra
te
 
 
GDP per capita
Note: The solid line represents the overall trend computed using a Lowess smoother.
Data: Total fertility rate and GDP per capita: World Bank (2017).
gitudinal perspective. For most MENA countries, a strong decline in fertility was
associated with little progress in the development of GDP per capita. With a strong
increase in GDP per capita, the decline in fertility levelled oﬀ. In general, unlike
the HDI, there was no increase of fertility associated with improving economic
progress at any level.
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Figure 2.4: Time series association of total fertility and GDP per capita,
1980-2015.
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2.4 Progress in health
Another component of human development in the focus of demographic transi-
tion theory ismorbidity andmortality (Davis 1945; Notestein 1945). Here, wemea-
sure mortality using total life expectancy at birth, as well as female life expectancy
at birth. The cross-sectional association of total life expectancy with fertility for
the years 1960, 1975, 2000, and 2015 is shown in Figure 2.5. Obviously, fertility
declined with increasing life expectancy. The association between life expectancy
and fertility increased strongly over time (year 1960: 𝑟2 = -0.255, year 1975: 𝑟2 =
-0.496, year 2000: 𝑟2 = -0.785, year 2015: 𝑟2 = -0.807). Furthermore, the slight in-
crease at higher ages of life expectancy found in 2015 disappeared after excluding
Israel.
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between total fertility and life expectancy at birth, 1960,
1975, 2000, and 2015.
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Data: Total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth: World Bank (2017).
Again, the time series association of total fertility and life expectancy at birth
shown in Figure 2.6 yield deeper insight into the increasingly negative cross-
sectional relation. For many MENA countries (e.g., Bahrain, Comoros, Mauri-
tania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria), the increase in life expectancy was not
immediately followed by a decline in fertility as suggested by the theory of de-
mographic transition. Accordantly, fertility decline started after a certain level of
life expectancy was exceeded, but with varying levels of life expectancy. In other
MENA countries (Djibouti, Iraq, Libya, Oman, and Yemen), fertility was still in-
creasing while life expectancy was falling. In a third group of countries (Egypt,
Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey), increase in life expectancy was accompa-
nied by an increasing fertility from 1960 onwards.
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Figure 2.6: Time series association of total fertility and life expectancy at birth,
1960-2015.
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Data: Total fertility rate and life expectancy at birth: World Bank (2017).
2.5 Progress in human capital
The third component of human development is human capital. To measure hu-
man capital, we draw on the Barro-Lee educational attainment data which includes
diﬀerent measures of education both for the total population and for females
(Barro and Lee 2013; Lee and Lee 2016). In particular, we consider the percentage
of female population aged 15+ with no education, the percentage of female pop-
ulation aged 15+ with completed tertiary education, and on the average years of
schooling of females aged 15+.3
3 No data was available for Comoros, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, and Somalia. For all other
countries, quinquennial data is available from 1970 to 2010.
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Figure 2.7: Relationship between total fertility and average years of schooling
among females aged 15+, 1970, 1985, 2000, and 2010.
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Data: Total fertility rate and average years of schooling, females 15+: World Bank (2017).
Figure 2.7 depicts the relation between the average years of schooling of fe-
males aged 15+ for the year 1970, 1985, 2000, and 2010. Females’ average years of
schooling has been increased in all MENA countries, but in diﬀerent rates. Never-
theless, all the countries experienced a decline in fertility rates with the increase of
female schooling. In 1970, the association between the average years of schooling
was very strong (𝑟2 = -0.738), whereas it decreased slightly over time (year 1985: 𝑟2
= -0.683, year 2000: 𝑟2 = -0.590, year 2010: 𝑟2 = -0.594). Moreover, the relationship
between female average years of schooling and fertility seemed to be strongest in
the ﬁrst years of schooling (i.e., 0 to 5 years). Further analyses showed that the
declines in fertility after the ﬁrst years of schooling found in 1970 and 1985 were
mainly driven by Israel. After excluding Israel, a decrease in fertility was observed
only in the very ﬁrst years of schooling.
The time series association of total fertility and average years of female school-
ing shown in Figure 2.8 illustrates country-level trajectories. For all MENA coun-
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Figure 2.8: Time series association of total fertility and average years of schooling
among females aged 15+, 1970-2010.
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Note: The solid line represents the overall trend computed using a Lowess smoother.
Data: Total fertility rate and average years of schooling, females 15+: World Bank (2017).
tries, a strong increase in average years of schooling of females aged 15+ was as-
sociated with a strong decrease in fertility. However, with the increasing years
of schooling, the negative association seemed to become weaker and some coun-
tries even experienced a stall in their declining fertility depending on the country-
speciﬁc average years of female schooling. In general, the negative association
between total fertility and average years of female schooling is stronger in the ﬁrst
years of education which supports the ﬁndings of Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7 and 2.8 point out the importance of the ﬁrst years of education on
fertility. It is likely that the share of females without education, as compared to
the females with (at least) some education, drives the observed fertility patterns in
MENA countries.
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Figure 2.9: Relationship between total fertility and percentage female population
age 15+ with no education, 1970, 1985, 2000, and 2010.
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Data: Total fertility rate and percentage females 15+ with no education: World Bank (2017).
Figure 2.9 depicts the association between the percentage of females age 15+
with no schooling and fertility for the year 1970, 1985, 2000, and 2010. In 1970,
the association between the average years of schooling was very strong (𝑟2 = -
0.738). We observe almost linear associations with decreasing correlations since
1985 (year 1985: 𝑟2 = 0.712, year 2010: 𝑟2 = 0.636). With an increasing share of
females with no education, fertility rates increase substantially.
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Figure 2.10: Time series association of total fertility and percentage female
population age 15+ with no education, 1970-2010.
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Data: Total fertility rate and percentage females 15+ with no education: World Bank (2017).
The country-speciﬁc time-series associations shown in Figure 2.10 conﬁrm the
cross-sectional picture found in Figure 2.9: Fertility decreased almost linearly with
a decreasing percentage of females aged 15+without education. These results sug-
gest that the share of females with no schooling has considerable consequences
on fertility rates in all the MENA countries.
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Figure 2.11: Relationship between total fertility and percentage of female
population age 15+ with tertiary schooling; 1970, 1985, 2000, and
2010.
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Note: The solid line represents the overall trend computed using a Lowess smoother.
Data: Total fertility rate and percentage females 15+with tertiary education completed: World Bank
(2017).
A complementary indicator of human capital is the proportion of females aged
15+ with completed tertiary education. Figure 2.11 shows that this proportion in-
creased over time in all MENA countries, while fertility decreased. After an initial
increase in female tertiary participation associated with a decline in fertility, the
negative relation levelled oﬀ after a certain degree of female participation in ter-
tiary education. Thereafter, a further increase in tertiary education did not seem to
be followed by further declines in fertility. Also, further declines with the increase
in tertiary education found in 1970 and 1985 disappeared with the exclusion of
Israel.
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Figure 2.12: Time series association of total fertility and percentage tertiary
education, females aged 15+, 1970-2010.
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Data: Total fertility rate and percentage females 15+ with tertiary education competed: World Bank
(2017).
The time series association of the percentage of females with completed tertiary
education and fertility shown in Figure 2.12 yields deeper insight into the relation
from a longitudinal perspective. For most MENA countries, an initial increase
of the percentage of females aged 15 with tertiary education was associated with
strongly declining fertility. In some countries, the relation levelled oﬀ, though: In
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia, further increase of female tertiary education
was not followed by a continuing decline in fertility.
2.6 Gender Inequality
A further non-economic component of human development is gender equality,
which has been shown to be associated with fertility in developed countries. To
capture country-speciﬁc gender inequality we use the Gender Inequality Index
(GII) which “measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human
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Figure 2.13: Total fertility and gender inequality, 1995, 2000, 2010, and 2015.
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Note: The solid line represents the overall trend computed using a Lowess smoother.
Data: Total fertility rate: World Bank (2017); Gender inequality index: UNDP (2017b).
development – reproductive health, measured bymaternalmortality ratio and ado-
lescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats
occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and
older with at least some secondary education; and economic status, expressed as
labormarket participation andmeasured by labor force participation rate of female
and male populations aged 15 years and older. Higher levels of the GII indicates
more disparities between females and males and more loss to human develop-
ment” (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii).4
The cross-sectional association of gender inequality with fertility for the years
1995, 2000, 2010, and 2015 is shown in Figure 2.13. Obviously, there is a trend
towards decreasing gender inequality in all MENA countries accompanied by de-
clining fertility. The cross-sectional association is clearly non-linear and almost
4 Data on gender inequality is not available for Comoros, Djibouti, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine,
and Somalia. For most of the other countries, data is available for the years 1995, 2000, 2005,
and 2010-2015.
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Figure 2.14: Time series association of total fertility and gender inequality,
1995-2015.
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Data: Total fertility rate: World Bank (207); Gender inequality index: UNDP (2017b).
U-shaped. With decreasing gender inequality, the decline in fertility levelled oﬀ.
Furthermore, some slight increases in fertility rates after the 2000s are also ob-
served with very low levels of gender inequality.
The time series association of gender inequality and fertility shown in Figure
2.14 yields insight into the country-speciﬁc longitudinal relation. For all MENA
countries, except Israel, declines in gender inequality have been associated with
declines in fertility. However, there is a level oﬀ in fertility decline after a cer-
tain threshold of gender inequality has been passed. This threshold seems to be
country-speciﬁc.
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2.7 Controlling for country heterogeneity and time
trends
The preceding graphical analyses look at the evolution of the cross-sectional and
country-speciﬁc time-series association between fertility and human development.
In the analyses conducted so far, we could not establish the average eﬀect of
human development on fertility net oﬀ country-heterogeneity and time trends,
which might confound the fertility-development association. Therefore, we esti-
mate panel regression models that account for unobserved country-speciﬁc het-
erogeneity. Moreover, the multivariate approach allows us to check on gender
speciﬁc eﬀects in human capital and to quantify its impact on fertility.
In themodel a country’s total fertility rate is speciﬁed as the dependent variable,
while the indicator of development (here HDI) and its square are the independent
variables:
𝑇𝐹𝑅𝑡,𝑐 = 𝜒𝑐 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑡,𝑐 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐷𝐼2𝑡,𝑐 + 𝜖𝑡,𝑐,
where 𝑡 indicates the year and 𝑐 the country. The ﬁrst two terms (𝜒𝑐 and 𝜆𝑡)
represent country-speciﬁc eﬀects and year-speciﬁc eﬀects common to all countries
(country and year ﬁxed eﬀects). The error term is assumed to be zero. The inclu-
sion of the square term is required to identify a reversal in the relationship.
In the empirical analyses we add the various indicators of human development
(i.e., HDI, GDP, life expectancy, diﬀerence in life expectancy, andGII) separately to
the model due to high multicollinearity. The comparison of model ﬁt parameters
yields evidence on the magnitude of the eﬀect of each development indicator. The
estimated coeﬃcients for human and economic development, progress in health,
and gender inequality are listed in Table 2.1. Table 2.2 includes the estimates for
our various human capital indicators.
Model 1 in Table 2.1 estimates the association between TFR and HDI. The
estimated coeﬃcients of HDI and HDI squared conﬁrm what the graphical analy-
ses suggested. Net of unobserved country-speciﬁc heterogeneity and shared time
trends, fertility declines with increasing human development. At higher levels of
human development, the association reverses to positive. The estimated coeﬃ-
cients are both signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p = .001).
Model 2 estimates the association between TFR and logged GDP per capita.
Most interestingly, the association between this economic aspect of human de-
velopment and fertility is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero under control of
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Table 2.1: Fixed country- and year-eﬀects panel regression of fertility on human
and economic development, progress in health and gender inequality.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
HDI -6.065∗∗
(-3.08)
HDI2 7.499∗∗∗
(5.08)
ln(GDP) 0.183
(1.01)
ln(GDP)2 0.268
(0.39)
Life 0.442∗∗∗
Expectancy (18.95)
Life -0.00442∗∗∗
Expectancy2 (-22.87)
Female life 0.446∗∗∗
Expectancy (18.83)
Female life -0.00428∗∗∗
Expectancy2 (-22.23)
Diﬀerence in 0.0833∗
Life Expectancy (2.33)
Diﬀerence in -0.00319
Life Expectancy2 (-1.06)
Gender Inequality -3.458∗∗
Index (-3.04)
Gender Inequality 4.232∗∗
Index2 (3.31)
Constant 5.683∗∗∗ 4.615∗∗ -3.840∗∗∗ -4.397∗∗∗ 6.725∗∗∗ 4.170∗∗∗
(7.94) (3.25) (-5.47) (-6.04) (41.63) (16.12)
N 554 1068 1366 1366 1366 164
𝑟2 0.747 0.844 0.876 0.872 0.814 0.643
BIC 512.7 2288.5 2709.8 2753.7 3258.1 -9.243
Note: ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001; t statistics in parentheses.
Data: TFR, GDP per capita, and life expectancy at birth: World Bank (2017);
Human Development Index: UNDP (2017a); Gender inequality index: UNDP (2017b).
72
unobserved country-and time-speciﬁc heterogeneity. Thus, as the graphical anal-
ysis has suggested, fertility in MENA countries does not decrease with an increase
in GDP.
Concerning progress in health, Model 3 estimates the association between
TFR and life expectancy at birth for the total population and Model 4 for females.
Similar to the relationship found in the bivariate models in Figure 2.5 and 2.6,
both models reveal signiﬁcantly increasing fertility with developments towards
longevity. Furthermore, with higher levels of life expectancy, fertility decreased
signiﬁcantly. Concerning the measures for model ﬁt (𝑟2 and BIC), total life ex-
pectancy slightly better predicts fertility compared to female life expectancy.5
As an indicator for gender inequality, we consider the diﬀerence in life ex-
pectancy at birth between males and females (Model 5). Bigger diﬀerences in life
expectancy between males in females are signiﬁcantly associated with higher fer-
tility. The estimated parameter of the squared term is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero indicating a linear relationship and no reversal in the association.
Moreover, fertility signiﬁcantly decreases with an increasingly decreasing gen-
der inequality index (Model 6). After a certain threshold of gender inequality has
been reached, fertility increases again signiﬁcantly.
Model 1 in Table 2.2 estimates the association between TFR and the average
years of total schooling, population aged 15+; andModel 2 the association between
TFR and the average years of total schooling, female population aged 15+. The es-
timated coeﬃcients indicate a signiﬁcantly nonlinear relation between fertility and
human capital net of unobserved country- and year-speciﬁc heterogeneity. With
an increase in years of schooling, fertility declined and increased signiﬁcantly for
higher levels of schooling. Most importantly, female average years of schooling
yields a better model ﬁt compared to average years of schooling of the total popu-
lation.
Model 3 and Model 4 estimate the association between TFR and the percent-
age of total respective female population age 15+ with no education. For both
indicators we ﬁnd signiﬁcant linear relations to total fertility, indicating increas-
ing fertility with a rising share of the population with no education, both total and
female population. Both indicators of model ﬁt, 𝑟2 and BIC, indicate that total
5 Additionally, we estimated comparable models using male life expectancy at birth. The model
yielded similar results. Concerning the measures of model ﬁt (𝑟2 and BIC), life expectancy was
predicted slightly better compared to male life expectancy.
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Table 2.2: Fixed country- and year-eﬀects panel regression of total fertility rate on
human capital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average years of -0.871∗∗∗
total schooling (-6.82)
Average years of 0.0212∗
total schooling2 (2.49)
Average years of -0.941∗∗∗
female schooling (-10.44)
Average years of 0.0345∗∗∗
female schooling2 (5.49)
Share of population 0.0578∗∗∗
with no education (5.00)
Share of population -0.000164
with no education2 (-1.55)
Share of females 0.0426∗∗∗
with no education (4.37)
Share of females 0.000155
with no education2 (1.71)
Share of population -0.394∗∗∗
with tertiary educ. (-7.72)
Share of population 0.0197∗∗∗
with tertiary educ.2 (7.98)
Share of females -0.376∗∗∗
with tertiary educ. (-7.99)
Share of females 0.0176∗∗∗
with tertiary educ.2 (8.13)
Constant 8.747∗∗∗ 8.203∗∗∗ 3.779∗∗∗ 2.568∗∗∗ 7.349∗∗∗ 7.115∗∗∗
(31.77) (51.88) (7.03) (5.41) (53.42) (57.54)
N 171 171 171 171 171 171
𝑟2 0.904 0.927 0.883 0.911 0.901 0.902
BIC 281.5 233.6 314.9 268.0 286.7 284.7
Note: ∗ 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < 0.001; t statistics in parentheses.
Data: TFR and all schooling indicators: World Bank (2017).
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fertility is better explained by the share of the female population without formal
education compared to the share of the total population.
Our third measure of human capital is the share of total and female population
aged 15+ with completed tertiary schooling. The estimated associations with TFR
are listed in Model 5 and Model 6, respectively. Net of unobserved country- and
year-speciﬁc heterogeneity, the estimated coeﬃcients indicate a signiﬁcantly non-
linear relation between the shares of total, as well as female, population with com-
pleted tertiary education. With increasing shares, fertility declined and increased
signiﬁcantly for higher shares. Compared to the share of the total population with
tertiary education, the female share yields only a moderately better model ﬁt.
Comparing our diﬀerent indicators for human capital, female participation in
education seems to be more strongly associated with fertility compared to total
participation (i.e., more than 90% of the within country variation was explained).
Among the female human capital indicators for females, the average years of
schooling is more strongly associated with fertility decline compared to the share
of females with no education or completed tertiary education. Most interestingly,
though, the share of females with no education is associated most strongly with
the decline in fertility as compared to the share of females with completed tertiary
education.
To have better insight into the relationship between various development com-
ponents and fertility, other than the continuous quadratic terms, we alternatively
used dummies for human development indicators with varying cut-oﬀ points (not
shown). Our ﬁndings further conﬁrmed the reversed relationship found for HDI
and GII after a certain threshold, suggesting that the reversing relationship found
did not depend on the quadratic speciﬁcation.
To evaluate the overall ﬁt of selected human development indicators, we ad-
ditionally present graphs which are preferable to summary statistics to show the
precise nature of discrepancies betweenmodel and data (cf. Bryant 2007). The sta-
tistical model for the graphs includes the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, fe-
male life expectancy, and average years of female schooling, as well as the squared
terms of these variables. Gender inequality is not considered in this analysis due
to the short time series of the data.
Figure 2.15 shows actual fertility rates and fertility rates predicted by the model
for each country according to the country’s development indicators. Due to miss-
ing data, no predictions are available for Comoros, Djobouti, Lebanon, Oman,
Palestine, and Somalia. For some countries (Bahrain, Morocco, Tunisia, and Tur-
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Figure 2.15: Actual and predicted fertility rates based on human development.
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Note: Predicted fertility rates were calculated using a panel model with ﬁxed country and time
eﬀects and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, life expectancy, and average years of female
schooling, as well as the squared terms of these variables.
Data: See Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.
key), we observe systematic over-prediction of fertility, in other countries (Israel,
Jordan, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, and Syria), we observe systematic under-pre-
diction. Under-prediction indicates that these countries lay behind human devel-
opment and have higher fertility than human development would suggest. Con-
trary, over-prediction indicates that these countries show fertility rates which are
advanced to their human development. For the other countries (Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen), the
trend in fertility is both advanced and behind human development, depending on
time.
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2.8 Discussion
Pioneering studies have shown the negative relationship between fertility and de-
velopment (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996; Bryant 2007; Lee 2003). More recently,
researchers have further questioned the fertility-development link and found that
the relationship between development and fertility reverses from negative to pos-
itive above a certain threshold (Luci-Greulich and Théveonen 2014; Myrskylä et
al. 2009). Nevertheless, research on fertility and development have mainly been
limited to the developed countries and less is known about developing countries.
Using health, wealth, and economic components, as well as the gender equality di-
mension of development, we investigated the relationship between development
and fertility for the MENA region, which is among the fastest growing regions in
the world (cf. Chapter 1).
Similar to Myrskylä et al. (2009), our results showed that the relationship be-
tween development, measured byHDI, and fertility followed an “inverse J-shaped”
pattern for MENA countries, and fertility started to increase with higher develop-
ment above a certain threshold. Most MENA countries have experienced consid-
erable improvements in their development levels and these ﬁndings suggest that
the association between HDI and fertility will reverse from negative to positive in
the future.
We further investigated to what extent the relationship found between develop-
ment and fertility can be explained by various development components. Whenwe
assessed the impact of economic development on fertility, the negative relation-
ship between economic progress and fertility was found only during the transi-
tion from very low levels of economic progress to low levels of economic progress.
Thus, economic progress is not likely to have considerable consequences on fer-
tility in the future, as most of the MENA countries have already achieved certain
levels of wealth.
As compared to the economic component of development, the non-economic
components of development were more strongly associated with fertility. In line
with the Demographic Transition Theory, country-speciﬁc analyses showed that
the increase in life-expectancywas not immediately followed by a decline in fertility
for most countries (exceptions were Lebanon and Turkey which showed instant
decreases in fertility with the increase in life expectancy). Fertility rates started to
decline after a certain level of life-expectancy had been achieved.
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Furthermore, the relationship between education and fertility was substantially
strong. Speciﬁcally, the higher share of women with no education seemed to be
strongly related to high levels of fertility, whereas the share of females with ter-
tiary education was inﬂuential on fertility decline in the ﬁrst transition stage (i.e.,
from no females with tertiary education to some females with tertiary education).
According to the World Bank (2017), half of the countries (i.e., 11/22) included
in this study had female literacy rates lower than 80 percent in 2010. This points
out that the notable share of women living in these countries is illiterate or with
no education. If this share of women continues to decrease in the future, fertility
should further decline.
Apart from health and education, gender inequality was correlated to fertility.
As MENA countries are becoming more gender egalitarian, we have found de-
clines in fertility rates. However, similar to the HDI, the relationship was reversed
after reaching a certain threshold. One explanation of these changing trends could
be that advancing gender equity in social institutions helps men and women to
combine employment with having children, rather than leaving women with dis-
tinct choices between either children or employment (McDonald 2000a).
Our ﬁxed-eﬀects models provided further support to the bivariate analyses and
indicated that the relationships found for various development indicators and fer-
tility were not due to the unobserved country and time characteristics. Our alter-
native measure for gender inequality (i.e., diﬀerence in life expectancy between
men and women) included in the ﬁxed-eﬀect models also conﬁrmed that higher
gender inequality was associated with higher fertility. Moreover, diﬀerent speci-
ﬁcation methods (i.e., models using continuous quadratic functions and develop-
ment dummies, respectively) further supported the reversing relationships found
for HDI and GII in the bivariate analyses.
Overall, ﬁxed-eﬀect models indicated that education, especially average years
of female schooling and share of females with no education, had the strongest
association with fertility. Gender inequality, on the other hand, was less strongly
related to fertility as compared to the other indicators of development.
Combined all these ﬁndings suggest that investing in human capital and other
non-economic development components has more of an impact on fertility than
economic progress. A “J-shaped” fertility-development relationship also exists in
MENA countries. If advances in economic and social development continues (i.e.,
increasing HDI and gender equality), someMENA countries with higher levels of
development may experience an increase in their fertility rates after reaching a
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certain threshold level of development. On the other hand, countries in which the
level of development is relatively low in comparison to the others, and where the
shares of females with no schooling are rather high, may have declining fertility
rates until they reach a certain level of development.
Despite its contributions we acknowledge some limitations when interpreting
the results of this study. Firstly, we only used the TFR to measure fertility, since
TFR is the only available fertility measure for most of the MENA countries. As
suggested by the literature (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Sobotka and Lutz 2011),
TFR may be biased in the presence of tempo eﬀects, e.g. delayed childbearing
to higher ages. Nonetheless, as shown by Engelhardt and Schulz in Chapter 1
of this volume, changes of age-speciﬁc fertility patterns in MENA countries are
considerably diﬀerent to Western countries, which have shown a rising mean age
at ﬁrst birth since the 1970s (Balbo et al. 2013). There is not much evidence
suggesting a shift in childbearing to higher ages. Therefore, it is plausible that the
TFR captures fertility trends in MENA countries well.
Secondly, we acknowledge the fact that migration may have consequences on
fertility, as immigrants have diﬀerent fertility patterns compared to the natives
(Sobotka 2008; Goldstein 2009; Myrskylä et al. 2011) and we could not rule out
these factors in the analyses.
Third, Bongaarts (2010) pointed out the high share of individuals with unmet
need for contraception and unwanted pregnancies in developing countries. Re-
search on fertility and development could be further improved by taking these
factors into consideration.
Lastly, we found that some countries’ predicted and actual TFR showed signif-
icant discrepancies. For some countries (e.g., Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey), fertility
was overestimated using diﬀerent indicators of human development, whereas it
was underestimated for some others (e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria). Why such
patterns are observed is still a riddle and future research needs to be undertaken
to understand these patterns more clearly.
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